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ABSTRACT
In the Netherlands there is a growing debate over the possibility of
introducting `compassionate interference' as a form of good psychiatric
care. Instead of respecting the autonomy of the patient by adopting an
attitude of non-interference, professional carers should take a more active
and commited role. There was a great deal of hostile reaction to this
suggestion, the most commonly voiced criticism being that it smacked of
`modern paternalism'. Still, the current conception of care leaves us with a
paradox. On the one hand patients are regarded as individuals who have
a strong interest in ( and a right to) freedom and non-interference; on the
other hand many of them have a desperate need for flourishing, viable
relationships. In fact, part of their problem is that they cannot relate very
well with other people. This creates a dichotomy, because respecting
patients' autonomy often means that they cannot be given the help they so
desperately need. In this respect current care practices do not answer the
caring needs of these patients.The criticism on care practices is to be
considerd as important. It invites us to reexamine and reevaluate the
current conception of caring relationships and its main values. In line
with this reexamination an alternative perspective on care is introduced
in this paper, a perspective in which `compassionate interference' is not so
much a threat to autonomy, but a means of attaining autonomy. For this
we need a different definition of autonomy than that commonly used in
current care practice.
INTRODUCTION
In 1993 a nurse working as a specialised practitioner in social
psychiatric care in the city of Rotterdam in the Netherlands
caused a controversy when he pleaded for the introduction of
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(Henselmans, 1993)
Most of the patients he and his colleagues treat are homeless
drug addicts, living on the streets and marginalised by society.
Many have a long history of psychiatric care. Some survive by
learning the `language' of their professional carers. They often
act in a manipulative way, abusing the help that is offered.
Others, perhaps out of anger or bitterness, simply refuse care.
The situation of these patients is the worst of all, because the
professional carer can do nothing but stand on the sidelines.
Patients have a right to self-determination and professional carers
are not allowed to intervene. It was against this background that
the plea for `compassionate interference' was made.
In making this plea the nurse was stressing the need for a
different outlook on what good care should mean. He was
suggesting that instead of respecting the autonomy of the patient
by adopting an attitude of non-interference, professional carers
should take a more active and committed role. They should not
stand aside. On the contrary, they should keep an eye on their
patients, look them up and provide advice and help where
necessary. There was a great deal of hostile reaction to this
suggestion, the most commonly voiced criticism being that it
smacked of `modern paternalism'. `Compassionate interference'
does not appear to be the politically correct approach in caring
relationships today. It seems that a professional attitude of
attentiveness and commitment does not go hand in hand with
respect for patients' autonomy.
The nurse pointed out, however, that the current conception
of care leaves us with a paradox. On the one hand patients are
regarded as individuals who have a strong interest in ( and a right
to) freedom and non-interference; on the other hand many of
them have a desperate need for flourishing, viable relationships.
In fact, part of their problem is that they cannot relate very well
with other people. This creates a dichotomy, because respecting
patients' autonomy often means that they cannot be given the
help they so desperately need. In this respect current care
practices do not answer the caring needs of these patients.
I consider the criticism on care practices to be important. It
invites us to reexamine and reevaluate the current conception of
caring relationships and its main values. In line with this
reexamination I will introduce an alternative perspective on
care, a perspective in which `compassionate interference' is not
so much a threat to autonomy, but a means of attaining
autonomy. For this we need a different definition of autonomy
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investigating what respect for autonomy means in today's medical
setting.
RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY
In the last thirty years we have witnessed a development towards
more patient autonomy in health care. The principle of
beneficence has been replaced by the principle of autonomy.
According to the ethicist Pellegrino this change can be
considered the most radical in the long history of the
Hippocratic tradition. The relationship between the professional
carer and the patient has become more honest and open, and
shows more respect towards the dignity of the patient.
(Pellegrino, 1990)
The concept of autonomy recognises the human capacity for
self-determination and puts forward the principle that the
autonomy of the individual ought to be respected. This general
description of autonomy still allows for different interpretations.
Like many other moral concepts, such as justice and equality,
autonomy derives its meaning in the context of a particular
theoretical perspective. Many contemporary and leading
philosophers and ethicists seem to construe autonomy as a
capacity of individuals. For instance, Bruce Miller in the
Encyclopaedia of Ethics distinguishes three elements of the capacity
for autonomy: agency, independence and rationality. Agency is
awareness of oneself as having desires and intentions and of
acting on them. In short, it is an account on how a person is able
to act. Independence, as the second element, refers to the
absence of influences which so control what a person does that it
cannot be said that he or she actually wants to do it. Autonomy
requires that individuals have an adequate range of options. The
third element of the capacity of autonomy is means-end
rationality. There are several ways to understand rationality as
an element of autonomy, but it certainly requires that persons
are able to reflect critically on their desires and beliefs.
Respect for autonomy as capacity can be shown in several ways.
The minimum content for the principle of respect for autonomy
is that persons should have independence, that it be free from
coercion or other similar interferences. Respect for autonomy
also brings with it the idea of self-determination. An individual's
right to make his own decision can be seen as a right against
other individuals or against the state, but the point in either case
is that others would be wrong to use coercion or manipulation, to
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decisions.
In these interpretations autonomy is mainly understood in
political and legal terms. The concept of individual autonomy is
often suggested by the analogy with autonomous states which
have the right to govern their own internal affairs. Individuals are
seen as `sovereign authorities' over a wide range of matters
concerning their lives.
This dominant interpretation of autonomy is also shown in the
context of health care. The principle of respect for the autonomy
of persons in terms of respect for the right of self-determination
has been expressed in several medical laws. For instance, in the
last eight years seven separate laws on patient autonomy have
been accepted in the Netherlands. The two most important ones
are the Law on Contracts of Medical Treatment (WGBO) in 1995
and the Law on Special Admission of Psychiatric Hospitals (Wet
bopz) in 1994. The WGBO defines patients rights in professional
health-care situations, such as the right of informed consent and
the right to refuse medical treatment. The Wet bopz defines the
legal position of the psychiatric patient who faces possible
coercive institutionalisation. In contrast to the past, coercive
institutionalisation and coercive treatment is no longer justified
for paternalistic reasons. The right of self-determination
overrules considerations of protecting the well- being of patients.
Coercive interventions are legally and morally justified, only in
cases of severe risk or danger to society and patient.
But this dominance of the right of self-determination is now
being questioned, particularly in the context of psychiatric health
care. In fact, reservations about the view that the right of self-
determination should always prevail unless society or the patient
himself are at great risk were already being raised in 1995, shortly
after the Wet bopz came into force. In 1997 the Dutch
government asked the National Council for Care for advice as
to whether coercive interventions for reasons of protecting the
well-being of patients could not be justified under certain
circumstances. In posing this question, the government began
a revaluation of the Wet bopz. This revaluation was all the more
pressing when certain recent developments in health-care
policies are taken into consideration. In the Netherlands, a
process of de-institutionalisation has been taking place. Patients
with chronic diseases increasingly remain outside the
institutionalised forms of care. Care is becoming more socially
integrated and the patient becomes more emancipated. A side
effect of this process of deinstitutionalisation is that sometimes
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particularly to patients who have developed a deep mistrust of
the care system and because of this avoid or refuse care.
In 1997 the National Council for Care published its report. In
the report it was suggested that under certain circumstances
coercive treatment and coercive admission for reasons of the
well-being for the patient could be justified. The perspective of
respect for autonomy is maintained in this justification.
Paternalistic reasons simpliciter are not acceptable. The moral
justification is concentrated on the discussion of questions of
competence and voluntariness in decision-making and choice-
making. The moral justification made use of a so-called
`balancing strategy'. In line with what the proposal Buchanan
and Brock had made in their book Deciding for Others in 1989, a
what is known as a risk-related standard was introduced to strike
an appropriate balance between respect for autonomy and
concern for patient well being. If the risks are high, a strong
standard of competence is required. If the risks are low, a weaker
standard of decisionmaking capacity is appropriate. The
implication of this balancing strategy is that a standard of
competence should vary in significant part with the effects for the
patient's well-being of accepting his or her choice.
At this point I want to make two brief comments on the
outcome of the discussion as it was presented by the Council on
Care. First of all, in the report the emphasis on autonomy as the
main moral value in caring relationships is maintained and
because of that the moral discussion is restricted to criteria of
autonomous decision-making and choice-making. The
perspective on autonomy itself is not questioned and what is
more, respect for autonomy as the dominant moral value in
caring relationships is not questioned either. And so, secondly,
other interpretations of good caring practices are not put
forward in the discussion. For instance, very little attention is
paid to the issue of how the need for coercive interventions can
be prevented or, to put it another way, how a situation in which
only two strategies remain Ð leave the patient as he is or use
coercion Ð can be avoided. It was to prevent such situations that
the Rotterdam nurse, in 1993, pleaded for a different conception
of care.
Finding solutions to the above mentioned problems in
psychiatric health care, we need a different perspective on care
and a different interpretation of the role and status of the value
of autonomy in caring relationships. To this end I want to make
use of a perspective on care in which the discussion is not forced
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developing a more relational model of autonomy, interventions
in care can be shown to be in the interest of patients, that is, they
can be seen as interventions for attaining autonomy, instead of
threatening autonomy. In developing this alternative perspective
it can be shown that some of the problems which have brought
about requests for more coercion are, in fact, the result of a
particular conception of care in which autonomy is the main
value and in which other values and ways to relate are neglected.
For my argument I will make use of the `care perspective' as
developed in some feminist writings.
A SHORT OUTLINE OF CARE PERSPECTIVE
In the bioethics literature the terms `care' and `caring' are often
used interchangeably to describe a form of moral reasoning, a
care practice or a feminist theory of ethics. This has led to the
criticism that care ethics is a hopelessly vague and ambiguous
term. To a certain extent some of these criticisms are justified
and a clear definition of what care ethics amount to is needed. In
a recent article in the Journal of Philosophy and Medicine Margaret
Olivia Little understands correctly, in my view, care ethics first
and foremost as an orientation or perspective on the moral
world. The care orientation is defined `in terms of emphases of
concern and discernment (to notice and worry more, say, about
the dangers of abandonment rather than about the dangers of
interference), habits and proclivities of interpretation (the
proclivity, say, to read ``the'' moral question presented by a
situation in terms of responsibilities, rather than rights) and
selectivity of skill (to have developed, say, an attunement to
difference more than an ease of abstraction' (Little, 1998, 195).
In the care perspective a relational account of moral agency and
an idea of interdependency as characteristic of human existence
are emphasised. In the care perspective the ideal of
independency as self-sufficiency is fiercely criticised. That is,
the idea that a good life is a life in which we do not need help or
support from anyone in meeting our needs and carrying out our
life plan is criticised. Instead, the value of depending on others
and being depended upon is then recognised. The idea of the
self as `disembedded and disembodied' that has played a
prominent role in moral and political theory, is also rejected in
the care perspective. Instead, the self is conceived as a relational
and embedded self. Besides these more or less fundamental
anthropological insights, care often denotes an epistemic
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care perspective emphasises an alternative moral epistemology,
in which attention, contextual and narrative appreciation and
communication are considered as elements of moral deliberation
(Walker, 1992). In short, care as an orientation can be seen as a
practice, in which the concerns and needs of the other are taken
as a basis for action and in which attentiveness and
responsiveness are seen as epistemic virtues.
Understanding care ethics as a different perspective on the
moral world, also asks for a rethinking of the place and status of
some of the concepts in the moral scheme. For instance, some
have pointed to the importance of trust and self-trust in moral
life (Baier, Govier), others, such as Robin Dillon, have developed
a care perspective on the notion of respect. And there are those
who have insisted on a different interpretation of autonomy. For
that, they have developed a relational or dialogical conception of
autonomy.(Keller, 1997) In developing this relational account of
autonomy, the idea of autonomy in terms of self-governance has
not been deserted in care ethics. Only, the individualistic account
of human nature that seems to underlie the liberal conception of
autonomy is criticised. An account of the moral agent as an
`encumbered self', in which the self is always already embedded
in relationships with flesh-and-blood others and is partly
constituted by these relationships is developed. By developing a
relational concept of moral agency, care ethicist's stress the
necessity of having relationships in order to see oneself as
autonomous. Relationships are of importance in developing
autonomy in at least two senses. First, instead of defining
autonomy in opposition to social relationships, autonomy is
made possible by our social relationships. That is, to become
autonomous, an individual must receive the appropriate kind of
social training.
Secondly, the self is relational in the sense that one of the
fundamental ways a person conceives himself and thinks about
the world around him is in terms of the relationships in which he
is involved (Keller, 1997). An autonomous person asks himself
questions such as `can I take responsibility for this or that action
while retaining my self-respect?' or `could I bear to be the sort of
person who can do that?'. The self that is consulted in these
questions is a self that is constituted in a dialogical process with
Ð as Charles Taylor would say Ð significant others. In this
dialogical process notions of self-trust, self-esteem and self-
respect are being developed. These very same notions can be
seen as necessary conditions for autonomy and autonomous
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making autonomous decisions is not only a question of having
the adequate capacities, but also, and more importantly, a matter
of his having a sense of his `self' that would support a full sense of
flourishing. And this last also depends on the social institutions
and the forms of socialisation one is subject to. In other words,
the social and cultural context one is in, has a profound
influence on self-respect and thereby on autonomy. (Verkerk,
1998, 125)
In short, the care perspective in developing a relational
account of autonomy puts emphasis on how to achieve
autonomy. It thereby considers autonomy as an empirical notion,
to be achieved by an empirical self and not by a transcendental
self, who rises above the material world. In stressing autonomy as
something to be attained, it distinguishes itself from the more or
less political and legal interpretation of autonomy in terms of
non-interference. The next question is, how does a care practice
look in which the target of achieving autonomy is central?
THE CARING RELATIONSHIP
At least two perspectives on care can be distinguished. There is
the concept of care relationships as some form of contractual
relationship between the care giver and the care receiver. In care
as a contract, care is mainly seen as a product or as some sort of
contractual agreement between two equal parties. The care giver
offers his help and if the care receiver does not want it, then that
is the end of the story. We cannot force him to accept the offer. I
don't think that care can be understood in this way, although the
dominant perspective on care seems to underline this concept of
care. In contrast to this perspective and in line with the writings
of the political theorist Joan Tronto, I would like to define care as
an ongoing process, which consists of four, analytically separate,
but interconnected phases: caring about, taking care of, care-
giving, and care-receiving. (Tronto, 1993)
Caring about. Caring about involves in the first place the
recognition, that care is necessary. It involves noting the
existence of a need and making an assessment that this need
should be met.
Taking care of. Taking care of assumes the responsibility for the
identified need and determining how to respond to it. Rather
than simply focussing on the needs of the other person, taking
care of involves recognition that one can act to address these
unmet needs.
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care. It involves physical work and almost always requires that
care-givers come in contact with the objects of care.
Care-receiving. Care-receiving recognises that the object of care
will respond to the care it receives. It is an important element of
the caring process because it provides the only way of knowing
that caring needs have actually been met.
Those four phases of care describe an integrated, well-
accomplished, act of care. Moreover, care as an ongoing process,
is to be considered as a moral practice. That is, care requires
specific moral qualities and the four ethical elements of
attentiveness, responsibility, competence and responsiveness are
related to the four phases of care as a process. Again, good care
implies that the four ethical elements of caring are to be
integrated into an appropriate whole. Tronto warns us that such
an integration of these parts of caring into a moral whole is not
simple. Care involves conflict; to resolve this conflict will require
more than an injunction to be attentive, responsible, competent
and responsive. In short, care as a practice involves more than
simply good intentions. It requires a deep and thoughtful
knowledge of the situation, and of all of the actors' situations,
needs and competencies. (Tronto, 1993, 137).
From this perspective on care, it is clear that respecting the
autonomy of the patient involves more than simply not
interfering. The care of a good carer requires that he or she is
attentive, responsible and competent. Central to the care
perspective are motifs such as the fundamental particularity
and interdependence of individuals, the attention and
understanding as modes of moral response and the insistence
on active sympathetic concern for another's good. In the care
perspective, respecting autonomy involves coming to understand
individuals in the light of their own self-conceptions and trying to
see the world form their point of view. But respect for persons
also involves taking account of both our connectedness and
interdependence. Again respect requires not so much refraining
from interference as recognising our power to make and unmake
each other as persons and exercising this power wisely and
carefully. (Dillon, 1992, 115) Compassionate interference can be
seen as an expression of this kind of caring behaviour.
Compassionate interference is an expression of caring behaviour
as well as being regulated by a particular caring respect for
persons.
In conclusion I want to address one criticism concerning the
care perspective. Sometimes the care perspective is criticised
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marginalisation of those who are dependent and in need of help.
It would threaten an even more oppressive paternalism than any
other previous relationship. The philosopher Anita Silvers has
put this criticism in the following words:
`Helping relationships are voluntary, but asymmetrically so.
Help-givers choose how they are willing to help, but help-takers
cannot choose how they will be helped, for in choosing to reject
proffered help one withdraws oneself from being helped as well
as from being in a helping relationship. To relate to others
primarily by being helped by them, then, implies subordinating
one's choices to one's caretakers, at least insofar as one remains
in the state of being helped.' (Silvers, 1995, 40)
Silvers' criticism is an important one, for if she is correct in her
argument, it would mean that the care perspective would be of
no use in developing good caring relationships, particularly for
those patients who are already marginalised in society. In fact,
Silvers states that socially devalued people Ð those perceived as
defective or deviant Ð cannot help but occupy inferior
positioning when drawn into such asymmetrical associations
(Silvers, 1995, 41). Silvers' criticism cannot only be considered
important, but history also proves her to be partly right. The
dominant social and health care practices throughout history
show one fundamental negative side-effect: they put the receiver
of care in a position in which he or she eventually has less self-
respect and dignity.
Silvers' criticism can be answered by stressing once again the
goal of good caring relationships. Care should always be related
to enhancing the capacity of people to define who they are, to
understand themselves and to direct their lives. As I said before,
care should not undermine autonomy, but should facilitate
autonomy. This is why the fourth dimension of the caring process
is of such an importance. Responsiveness requires that carers
remain alert to the possibility for abuse that arises with
vulnerability. Therefore I want to conclude by quoting Robin
Dillon, who wrote about the care perspective in the following
words:
`Care respect is a matter of relationship, with all, including all
the effort, which that involves. While Kantian respect Ð say the
respect for self-determination and non interference Ð might be
thought to distance us from one another, both in hiding our
particular selves from one another and in erecting protective
barriers of rights against each other, care respect can be seen to
involve a determination to discover, forge, repair, and strengthen
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respect joins individuals together in a community of mutual
concern and mutual aid, through an appreciation of individuality
and interdependence.' (Dillon, 1992, 129).
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